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Introduction
* This communication is a contribution to the work shop on "Natural Organisms, Artificial Organisms, and Their Brains" at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) in Bielefeld (Germany) on March 8 -1 2 , 1998.
In recent years classical ideas of representation as endorsed by logical paradigms, by classical arti ficial intelligence, cognitive science, and cognitive psychology, have been shown not to be without problems. The epitome of the classical approach is the notion of expert systems. The main underlying idea is that the knowledge of the expert can be extracted from the expert (a process called knowl edge acquisition), formalized and represented in a com puter system. This leads to the "knowledge" of the expert being represented in the symbol structures of a computer program. The symbols or symbol structures in the com puter program are set into correspondence with the outside world. This position is sometimes called cognitivistic.
Criticisms of the classical view of representation abound and we have no intention of reproducing them here (e.g. Brooks, 1991; Bursen, 1980; Clancey, 1997; Franklin, 1995; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996) . R ather than trying to dem onstrate why the classical view of representation is problematic, we intend to propose a view of representation that promises to shed new light on some of the hard problems: embodied cognitive science (Pfeifer and Scheier, in press ). When pursuing the approach of embodied cognitive science, it turns out that rep resentation is no longer a stored structure that can be investigated separately, but something that is part of a complete agent interacting with its eco logical niche.
Before we start, a note on the term representa tion as it will be used it in this paper is in place. According to Newell (1990, p. 59 ) the essence of representation is "... to be able to go from som e thing to something else by a different path when the originals are not available." He casts this as a general law, the representation law decode[encode(T )(en code(X ))] = T(X) where X is the origi nal external situation and T is the external trans formation. This view largely corresponds to the common-sense understanding of representation. If you are trying to understand and generalize some phenom enon, you use a particular type of repre sentation. Meteorologists use numbers to repre sent the amount of rain expected, data base de signers use linguistic labels like first and last names, street names, departm ent names to repre sent the customers, and numbers to designate the monthly income of an employee, electrical engi neers use schematics to represent the essential characteristics of electronic circuits, composers use musical notes to represent particular sound pat terns, and truck drivers use maps to represent the network of roads and streets. Within cognitive sci ence, psychologists and ethologists use statistical models and differential equations, brain research ers also use differential equations and they strongly depend on visualization and imaging tech niques: representing the to-be-explained phenom enon using methods from computer graphics. Note that all of these representations make some form of abstraction. If there is no abstraction, it is the same thing, not a representation. In this sense, rep resentation is much like a model. This is all un problem atic unless a representation is taken to be a m ental representation, i.e. as part of the mecha nisms that generate behavior.
In this paper we will not discuss mental repre sentation in the traditional sense in detail because it is, by definition, not linked to a particular physi cal medium such as a body but can be studied in dependently at the level of computational (algo rithmic) processes. Since one of our main points will be embodiment, we cannot sensibly discuss the classical concept of mental representation. But we will briefly illustrate the basic ideas of classical representation using the example of a connectionist model of category learning, A LCOVE (see below). Also, we will not discuss symbolic repre sentations. We follow Clancey (1997) in stating that symbolic representations are externally cre ated by humans -as in the examples given above -and have to be distinguished from the mechanisms that actually generate behavior. Ac cording to Clancey, confounding the two would constitute a category error. A large part of the lit erature in cognitive science is concerned with sym bolic representations. We will mostly talk about neural correlates of behavior or more generally about internal processes that -in the interaction with the real world -lead to certain behaviors. To use Cummins's (1989) term, the one aspect of representation that we are mostly interested in here is the one of covariance. This view is very natural and widely held in neurobiology. "How do we decide, for example, that a certain neural struc ture in the visual cortex of a frog is a motion de tector? Roughly, we notice that a certain charac teristic activity in the structure covaries with the presence of moving objects in the frog's field of vision. Given this fact, it seems natural to suppose that what makes that structure a m otion detector is just the fact that it fires when there is motion in the frog's visual field." (Cummins, 1989, p. 9) . Thus, the neural structure in question can be said to represent the occurrence of motion in the frog's visual field, o r -to use biological ja rg o n -it codes for m otion1. The main goal of this paper is to ex plore ways of understanding the interrelationship between behavior and internal processes in an agent.
We start by outlining the basic assumptions of embodied cognitive science. This includes a de scription of the frame-of-reference problem, the principle of complete agents, and a discussion of the importance of morphology for understanding representation. Then we discuss the implications of embodiment, that can be either dynamic or in formation theoretic, focusing on the information theoretic aspect. We then introduce some of the hard problems for representation, object con stancy and the problem of a continuously changing stream of sensory stimulation. We then discuss the potential solution suggested by a complete agent perspective: interaction with the environment, in particular sensory-motor coordination. The conse quences of this perspective are fundamental. They will be discussed using a suite of experiments on real and simulated robots. It is concluded that the complete agents perspective provides new insights into the thorny problems of representation and ex planation of behavior in general.
Embodied Cognitive Science
Two key aspects of embodied cognitive science are (a) the frame-of-reference problem, and (b) the complete agent perspective. We first briefly in troduce the frame-of-reference problem and then immediately move on to the complete agent per spective.
The frame-of-reference problem
When building a model of a natural system there are always a num ber of "participants" in 'This aspect strongly contrasts, for example, with the similarity view, which is typical for analogical, imagebased, and pictorial representations, where the repre sentation itself bears some similarity to the thing in the real world it is supposed to represent. The concept of similarity requires a kind of metric. Often, proper ties of the perceptual system are implicitly assumed to provide the metric (street maps and cities "look " similar to humans, especially if viewed from a bird's eye perspective). We will not elaborate these aspects any further. For details, see Cummins (1989) .
volved: the subject of investigation (e.g. the human infant in a project on category learning), the ob server (typically the scientist conducting the inves tigation), the model designer (often identical with the observer), the artifact (the computer simula tion program or the robot), and the environment.
The fram e-of-reference problem conceptualizes the relation between these "participants". There are three main aspects of the frame-of-reference problem:
(1) Perspective issue: We have to distinguish be tween the perspective of an observer looking at an agent and the perspective of the agent itself. In particular, descriptions of behavior from an observer's perspective must not be taken as the internal mechanisms underlying the described behavior. But the observer can try to understand what the world looks like from the agent's perspective. (2) Behavior-vs.-mechanism issue: The behavior of an agent is always the result of a system-environm ent interaction. It cannot be explained on the basis of internal mechanisms only. In other words, it cannot be reduced to internal repre sentation. (3) C om plexity issue: The complexity we observe in a particular behavior does not reflect the complexity of the underlying mechanisms. These points are illustrated in focus box 1. Fur ther illustrations of this principle will be provided as we go along. Note that all three aspects include the distinction between description of external be havior and the internal mechanism underlying that behavior. There is an unresolved dispute of where the description ends and the mechanism begins. A fter all, the only thing we ever have is a descrip tion, at least in the analytical disciplines. When we describe the mechanisms by which an ant gener ates its behavior, we provide a description of a rule that might govern its behavior (in the case of Si m on's ant on the beach: if there is an obstacle on the right, turn left (and vice versa), see focus box). In the area of autonomous robots, the situation is different. There, we not only have a description, but we have built a mechanism that actually un derlies the behavior of the robot. This is one of the essential features of the synthetic approach of em bodied cognitive science which makes it poten tially extremely powerful.
Box 1: Simon's ant on the beach
Simon has used the m etaphor of an ant to il lustrate some basic principles of behavior (Simon, 1969) . We use his m etaphor to illustrate the three aspects of the frame-of-reference problem out lined in the main text. Let us assume that an ant starts on the right and its nest is somewhere on the left. So, roughly the direction it travels is from right to left. Figure 1 shows a typical trajectory the ant might take. It is highly complicated because the beach is full of pebbles, rocks, puddles, and other obstacles. But this complexity is, in fact, only an apparent one. It would be a mistake to con clude from the -apparent -complexity of the trajectory that the internal mechanisms which are responsible for generating the behavior of the ant are also complex. This is the complexity issue. The mechanisms which are driving the an t's behavior may be very simple, implementing "rules" that we could describe as follows: "if obstacle sensor on left is activated, turn right (and vice versa)". These "rules" are, of course, implemented in the neural structures of the ant. It is im portant to realize that the rules alone are not sufficient to explain the ant's behavior. This is the behavior-vs.-mechanism issue.
The point is that the complexity of the an t's tra jectory emerges from the interaction of the ant with its environment, not from the internal m echa nisms or the environment alone: it would be just as erroneous to claim that the complexity of the Fig. 1 . Sim on's ant on the beach. The ant walking on the beach was suggested by Herbert A. Simon as an illustra tion of the fact that behavior that looks com plex to an outside observer may in fact com e about by very simple mechanisms. The figure also illustrates the fact that be havior cannot be reduced to internal mechanism.
trajectory is due to the complexity of the environ ment. The complexity of the environment is only a prerequisite. If we would increase the size of the ant, say, by a factor of 1 0 0 , and let it start in the same location with exactly the same behavioral rules as before, it would go more or less in a straight line. W hat appeared to the normal ant as obstacles would no longer be obstacles for the giant ant. Its sensors are not sufficiently fine grained to even detect the irregularities of the beach. The opposite is, of course, also possible: a behavior that looks very simple may be the result of complex processing. An example is moving a hand in a straight line from A to B. By using the synthetic methodology, it becomes immediately clear that this cannot be achieved by a simple mechanism. In the case of complex behavior, the mechanisms could also be complex, but they might b e -a n d often are-sim ple.
The com plete agent perspective
The complete agent perspective states that we have to study agents that are self-sufficient, auton omous, embodied, and situated. Self-sufficient means that the agent is capable of sustaining itself over extended periods of time. For the purposes of this paper, this aspect is neglected. Autonomous means that the agent behaves in the environment independent of external control, in particular in dependent of human control. Note that this per spective differs fundamentally from standard sim ulation models, where the mediation between the simulation and the real world is always done by a human experim enter2. Em bodied means that the agent has to be realized as a physical entity (which can also be simulated in the computer). Finally, the agent has to be situated meaning that it acquires all the information about the environ m ent through its own sensory system. This enables the agent to obtain its own history which, in turn, increases its level of autonomy. The complete 2 To be precise, a distinction between different types of simulation models has to be made, namely standard models and agent models. In agent models, the agentenvironm ent interaction is simulated: the agents are equipped with sensors and a motor system, as well as a body, and there is an environment that has its own dynamics, i.e. a dynamics that is at least partially inde pendent of the one of the agent. agent perspective is closely related to the frameof-reference problem. For example, when talking about situatedess, we are automatically trying to see the world from the perspective of the agent, rather than our own: what does the world look like to the agent? Let us now review some of the implications of complete agents with a focus on em bodim ent and representation.
Implications of the Complete Agent Perspective
There are two main implications of em bodi m ent, one dynamic (in the physics sense), the other information theoretic.
Robots, animals, and humans are physical sys tems interacting with their environments. N ature exploits embodim ent in beautiful and astonishing ways. An example is insect walking. Flolk Cruse and his collaborators have found that in insects there is no central controller to coordinate all the six legs in walking (e.g., Cruse et al., 1996) . How is it possible that coordinated walking can come about without central control? Legs do communi cate globally, but through the interaction with the environm ent, rather than through neural connec tions only. If an insect lifts one leg, the forces on all the others are instantaneously changed. This is due to the weight and stiffness of the insect and the surface on which it stands. There is in fact no need for a neural connection, or stated differently, the global communication between the legs is not "represented" within the agent (only some have connections), but all "communicate" with each other through the real world. Moreover, there is no internal global coordinating mechanism.
Considerations about dynamics are not only rel evant for insects, but also for humans. To illustrate this point, let us look at a classical psychological experim ent in which infants have to learn the loca tion of various objects in space (Piaget, 1952) . In this experim ent infants acquire a bias to reach towards a particular location (this is known as the "AnotB erro r"). If a weight is attached to the in fant's arm, this bias disappears (Diedrich et al., 1997) . It also disappears if the infants are in an upright position rather than sitting (Smith et al., 1997) . This experiment dem onstrates that there does not seem to be an internal representation of a decision process or a decision variable, but that the error results from the reaching dynamics. This is further supported by the fact that the bias is stronger, the more the infants have reached for a particular location (Smith et al., 1997) . These re sults dem onstrate the importance of embodiment when learning about objects in space. An example from engineering is Tad M cGeer's "dynamic pas sive w alker" (M cGeer, 1990a, b) . By exploiting the dynamics, walking behavior can be achieved that looks amazingly human-like but requires no in ternal representation or other kinds of internal processing. A version of such a walker with knees was built at Cornell University by Garcia et al. (in press) (Fig. 2) . Note that walking in this machine is not internally represented in the agent: walking is the result of the physics of the interaction with the environment. If we only observe the behavior of the passive dynamic walker, we might be tem pted to postulate an internal mechanism or an internal representation of walking, even though there clearly is none.
Let us now turn to the second implication of embodim ent, information theoretic aspects. The kinds of sensors, their shape, and how they are positioned on the robot have im portant effects on the design of the control architecture. Consider the following experim ent with simple robots, the Didabots. They are put into an arena with ran domly distributed styrofoam cubes. After a while (about 2 0 min) the styrofoam cubes have ended up either along the wall or in a small number of clusters. The details are elaborated in focus box 2 (Didabots). First, a short note on the frame-of- reference problem. The Didabots move the cubes into cluster, but there is no internal mechanism for clustering. There is also no internal representation of cubes, pushing, or clusters. All that is there in ternally is a simple artificial neural network, that implements the following rule: if there is sensory stimulation on the left, turn to the right (and vice versa). Why does it work? Again, the details are given in focus box 2. In essence, it depends on the exact geometric properties of the setup-up. The sensors (IR sensors in this case) have to have the right physical properties, namely a limited angle, through which they can measure reflected IR, and they have to be placed exactly in the right position. If their position is changed the behavior is changed entirely. For example, if the sensors are moved to the front of the robot, they will no longer clean up, but avoid the cubes most of the time. Thus, we see that we cannot interpret the neural signals, unless we are familiar with the physical properties of the robot, in particular its shape and the positioning of the sensors. Stated differently, the signals the robot's neural network gets strongly depend on its m orphology.
Box 2: Didabots
Didabots (D/dactical R obots) are simple robots equipped with infrared (IR) sensors, as shown in Fig. 3a . They are controlled by a very simple neu ral network that implements the following rule: if there is sensory stimulation on the left turn right (and vice versa), a rule intended for obstacle avoidance. If put into an arena with styrofoam cubes, they move the cubes into clusters, and some cubes end up along the wall (Fig. 3b) . The reason is given in Fig. 3c . Normally the robots simply avoid obstacles. If they happen to encounter a cube head on, they push the cube. However, they are not searching for cubes and then pushing them: because of the particular geometry and the arrangement of the sensors, they push the cubes if they happen to encounter them in the appropriate direction. How far do they push it? Until there is another cube on the side that will provide suffi cient sensory stimulation that the robot will turn away. But now there are already two cubes to gether and the probability that an additional cube will be deposited near them is higher. It is higher because the environment has changed, not be cause something has changed inside the robot: the Didabots are purely reactive. If now the position of the IR sensors is changed as shown in Fig. 3d , the Didabots will no longer move the cubes into clusters. For a more complete discussion of these experiments, see Maris and te Boekhorst (1996) .
B-LJ neural ■oetwi TJ LT Let us now look at an example from nature, housefly navigation, in particular the phenom enon of motion parallax. The details are given in focus box 3. One of the main implications for represen-tation is as follows. The elementary motion detec tors (EM Ds) can be said to represent motion to an outside observer. Although the uniform nature of the EM Ds suggests linear motion, the linear motion of a point through the visual field follows a sine law. The essential conclusions are that we can only understand representation if we know the morphology and the embedding of the neural net work in the complete agent.
Box 3: Motion parallax
What is shown in Fig. 4 is called the principle of motion parallax. In our discussion, we largely fol low Franceschini et al. (1992) . Motion parallax is the general term that refers to the fact that as the observer moves there are systematic movements in the visual field. The specific case we discuss here concerns the visual system of the fly. It is il lustrated in Fig. 4 . In the eye of the fly there is a non-uniform layout of the visual axes such that sampling of the visual space is finer towards the front than laterally. Figure 4a shows a point travel ing across densely spaced vision segments in the retina, 4b a point traveling across more widely spaced vision segments in the retina. Given the same speed, a point will move slowly across the (a) Fig. 4 . Exploiting motion parallax, (a) point traveling across densely spaced vision segments in retina, (b) point traveling across widely spaced vision segments in retina. Given the same speed, a point will move slowly across the retina if it is near the front of the agent, it will move fast, if it is on the side. Because the vision segments are spaced more densely in the front than on the side a point at a given distance from the agent will require the same amount of time to traverse one vision segment. retina if it is near the front of the agent, it will move fast, if it is on the side. Because the vision segments are spaced more densely in the front than on the side a point at a given distance from the agent will require the same amount of time to traverse one vision segment. The speed at which a point traverses the visual field follows in fact a sine law: it is small at small angles (near the front), has maximum value at 90 degrees and then decreases again.
This unequal spacing of the vision segments, the gradient, compensates for the sine law inherent in the optic flow field. The introduction of the sine gradient allows the underlying motion detection system to be built uniformly by elements each dis playing the same tem poral properties as its neigh bors. There is no need for neural circuitry to com pensate for the sine law. This illustrates a number of points. First, if we want to understand the beha vior of the agent it is not sufficient to look at the control architecture. By looking at the neural ar chitecture one could not say anything about the phonem on involved: we must take the embedding of the neural architecture into the morphologythe uneven spacing of the facets-into account. The homogeneous arrangements of EMDs in fact reflects a non-linear phenom enon which is "linear ized" by the morphology. As the fly is moving at constant speed, the speed of a point moving across the visual field changes according a sine law. The arrangem ent transforms this mapping into one of "constant speed of fly" -»• "constant speed of mo tion across visual field". Second, the non-uniform physical arrangem ent of the visual segments, the facets, makes additional circuitry for compensating the continuously changing angular speed unneces sary. This means that shape or morphology is traded for computation. Morphology exploits physical processes which are very rapid and deliv ers "good" sensory signals, "good" in the sense that they can be processed by a relatively simple neural architecture. Because the system has been designed through evolution, this arrangement of morphology (the uneven spacing of the facettes) and the neural substrate (the array of EMDs) leads to the appropriate obstacle avoidance beha vior. The EM Ds -to an outside observer -do not represent (in the covariance perspective) linear m otion, but m otion governed by a sine law.
Exploiting Embodiment to Solve Some of the Hard Problems of Representation
Agents in the real world have many hard prob lems to solve. We will focus on the following two that we introduced earlier on, the focus of attention problem and the problem of object constancy (or scaling problem). We illustrate these problem s with a category learning task that will occupy us for the rem ainder of the paper. Category learning is one of the most fundamental abilities of an adaptive agent: if the agent is not capable of making distinctions in the real world, e.g. distinguishing food from non food, predators from prey, the nest from the rest of the world, and con-specifics from others, it will not survive for very long. Similarly, robots that cannot make distinctions are not likely to be able to do very useful work. Moreover, categorization under lies much of learning, transfer of learning, induc tion, generalization and abstraction. Categoriza tion enables an agent to transfer what it has learned previously to a new situation. Upon entering a room, people instantly recognize chairs, computers, flowers, tables, and just about everything else they perceive. Organisms are often born with some a pri ori knowledge about the categories relevant to their ecological niche. Many animals, for example, have innate tastes for certain foods. Or certain rodents are born with knowledge of how to categorize shad ows of predatory birds flying above them. Although such categorical knowledge is largely innate, it is al ways shaped to a certain degree by experience, i.e. by interactions of the organisms with its environ ment. Often, animals learn to use additional sen sory modalities to make categorization more effi cient, as when searching for food. In higher organisms, most categories are learned (Barsalou, 1992) .
The behavior of interest is thus how agents are able to acquire and use categorical knowledge. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to review the very large literature on categorization and cate gory learning in natural agents (see e.g. Barsalou (1992) for review). In what follows, we will focus on research conducted in two disciplines which have particularly contributed to the current understand ing of categorization in humans: cognitive psy chology and developmental psychology. Cognitive psychology has approached categorization from an information processing perspective (Fig. 5) . . The information processing approach to categori zation. According to this view, categorization proceeds through the following steps: First, a structural descrip tion of the entity to be categorized is formed. Next, cate gory representations with similar structural descriptions are searched, and the most similar category representa tion is selected. Based on the selected representation, inferences about the entity are drawn, and finally infor mation about the categorization is stored in memory (adapted from Barsalou, 1992, p. 48 ).
According to this view, categorization in humans and higher animals involves the following steps (Barsalou, 1992) . First, a structural description of the object to be categorized is formed. This descrip tion provides information about the object's prim i tive perceptual features such as horizontal and ver tical lines as well as the relations between these basic features. Next, category representations with similar structural descriptions are searched in m em ory, and the most similar category representation is selected. Based on the selected representation, in ferences about the object are drawn, and finally in formation about the categorization is stored in memory. If the object is a chair, for example, the categories chair, sofa, stool, or table might be con sidered, given their structural similarity. The selec tion process would then choose the category chair because it is the most similar. Inferences about the chosen category chair would then be drawn, for in stance that it can be sat upon.
Much of the research on categorization in cogni tive psychology has focused on the search and se lection stages3. In particular, most recent work has 3 A notable exception is a framework suggested by Lakoff (1987) according to which categories are em bodied, that is grounded in perception, body move ment, and experience of a physical and social character.
investigated the relative merits of two types of models4: (1 ) in exemplar models, the learner stores m ental representations of exemplars, grouped by category, then categorizes new instances on the ba sis of their similarity to the stored exemplars. That is, according to the exemplar view people do not form abstract category knowledge but rather store collections of exemplars; (2 ) in p rototype models, the learner stores a single, centralized, category representation, i.e. a prototype, rather than en sembles of exemplars.
Category learning in connnectionist m odels
In what follows, we will focus on a connectionist model that incorporates most of the currently ac cepted concepts of categorization. Later on we will contrast this model with the complete agent per spective. Most connectionist models of categoriza tion consist of an input layer that codes object fea tures and an output layer that represents the categories (e.g. Gluck and Bower, 1988) . Typically, the goal is to learn -via supervised learning schemes such as the delta rule -an association or mapping between activations in the input layer and the corresponding activations in the category layer. O ne of the currently most popular models of categorization in psychology is ALCOVE (see focus box).
Box 4: ALCOVE
A LCO V E (e.g. Kruschke (1992) ; ALCOVE = attentional learning covering map) is a connectionist model of category learning. ALCOVE is a feedforward network with three layers of nodes. There is an input layer, a hidden layer, and an out put layer. The input nodes encode the stimulus, one node per feature dimension or feature. Each input node of A LCO V E is connected to the hid den layer via so-called attention weights. These weights grow to reflect the relevance of a dimen sion for the categorical distinction being learned. A large weight between an input and a hidden node indicates that the network pays more atten 4 We do not discuss the more classical approaches to categorization that view categorization as being based on predicate logic. Although these are of historical interest, they are not considered to be valid models anymore.
tion to the feature encoded by that input node. The hidden layer consists of nodes that represent training exemplars (i.e. they light up as the feature vector representing the exemplar is presented at the input layer). The activation of a hidden node reflects the similarity of the stimulus to the exem plar represented by that node. These "exem plar" nodes compute their activation in two steps: First, they compute the distance between the stimulus and the exemplar they represent, then they com pute their activation as a monotonically decreasing function of distance. The closer the input to the stored exemplar, the larger the activation of the exemplar node. Finally, the output layer consists of one node per category, with each node's activation computed as a sum of weighted activations from the exemplar nodes. The activations in the output nodes are interpreted as indicating the probability with which the network chooses a particular cate gory in response to a particular input. Large activ ations lead to a high probability, and vice versa. Learning is supervised and involves a learning and a test phase. In the learning phase, input vec tors (typically binary feature vectors) are pre sented to the network. The network processes this input and activates one or several category nodes. The difference between the network output and the correct output (the "categorization error") is then propagated back to the hidden layer where the weights are adjusted in order to minimize the error. Note that this is, in essence, the standard backpropagation algorithm (for a discussion of the category nodes learned association weights exemplar nodes learned attention strengths Fig. 6 . Overview of the ALCOVE network. It is a three layer feedforward network. There is an input, a hidden and an output layer. The weights between the input and the hidden layer are called attentional strengths. The hidden neurons represent the exemplars the network has learned. The output nodes represent the categories. stimulus dimension nodes similarities and differences between ALCOVE and standard backpropagation, see Kruschke, 1992) . In the test phase, the output or category nodes are activated by summing across all the hid den nodes, weighted by the association weights be tween the hidden and the output layer. The output of the network is then com pared to data obtained from human subjects.
In summary, the A LCO V E instantiates the view that category learning is supervised, and that cate gorization consists in finding a mapping from stim uli onto category representations.
The ALCOVE model incorporates a num ber of fundamental assumptions with respect to categori zation which are representative for many cognitive models of categorization, in particular the exem plar view discussed above. The main points to be noted with respect to representation are that (a) the model is form ulated on a very high-level of abstraction, (b) categories are represented explic itly as category nodes in the output layer of the network, and (c) there is no connection to the out side world: input and output are represented as feature vectors. M oreover, the output of the model has to be interpreted by the modeler. These char acteristics are in sharp contrast to the complete agents approach to categorization. We will use the ALCOV E model to work out these differences. Note that the goal is not to criticize the A LCOVE model, but rather to illustrate where the standard cognitive model of categorization differs from the complete agents approach.
The fundamental question with respect to repre sentation is the relation between the category rep resentation and the real world. According to cog nitive psychology, categories are structures in the cognitive system which represent perceived items in the environment. For example, the category chair represents certain visual and tactile stimuli. Thus, in this view the mind represents the external world by structuring a set of symbols so that the symbols are in correspondence with the structure of the external world. Consequently, most of the current debates in cognitive psychology, for exam ple, concern the structure of internal representa tions (e.g. exemplar vs. prototype). M oreover, cat egorization is separated from perception. That is, categorization uses the structural description pro vided by the perceptual system and places the en tity into a category (Barsalou, 1992) . The creation of the structural description is not part of the model, but given by the designer of the model. This view on categorization is clearly disem bodied in that categories are seen as being separate from perception or action. This is also reflected in the ALCOVE model where the categories are nodes in a layer of a neural network that can only be interpreted by attaching a symbolic label to them. There is no connection to the real-world, the input stimuli are highly abstract designer-defined de scriptions of entities in the real world. The main task of the network is to activate a category node, given some input feature vector.
In what follows, we will challenge this view on categorization using results from embodied cogni tive science.
Category learning based on static sensory data
The cognitivistic paradigm focuses on internal structures onto which external stimuli have to be mapped. In typical simulation models, only static stimuli are used. This is, however, not realistic when considering a complete agent interacting with the real world (as discussed earlier). M ore over, there is evidence suggesting that it is very hard to learn categories from static stimuli only. In a recent study, Nolfi (1996) has studied a robota Khepera™ 5 robot, a popular research tool in the field of embodied cognitive science -whose task was to distinguish between walls and target objects (small cylinders). In other words, the robot faced a category learning problem: it had to learn to dis tinguish between walls and targets. The walls and target objects were sampled by placing the robot in front of them, and storing the activations of the six IR sensors for 180 different orientations and for 20 different distances. These data were then used to train a backpropagation network to cate gorize the two types of objects. Three types of net work architectures were used: a two-layer network with six input neurons (one for each IR sensor), and one output neuron (coding walls by respond ing with a 0 , and targets by responding with a 1 ), and two architectures where an additional layer of 5 Khepera™ is a circular miniature robot with about 5cm diameter and is, depending on how it is equipped, 5 to 10 cm high. Its infrared (IR) sensors have a maxi mum range of about 5cm.
four and eight hidden neurons have been added, respectively. The networks received the sampled sensory data at their input layer, and their task was to learn to respond appropriately by activating the output node for sensory data originating from targets, and by being silent when data from the walls were pre sented. Note that this essentially corresponds to the approach taken by most connectionist models of categorization according to which categoriza tion involves mapping sensory patterns onto cate gory representations (the output node). There is no m otor component. Also note that the problem seems to be simple because walls are very distinct from the small target objects used in the study. Thus, it seems at first sight that in this trivial case, the mapping from inputs to category node should be learnable. The results of these experiments were as follows. Networks with no hidden units correctly categorized 2 2 % of the patterns, while networks with hidden units, on average, were cor rect in 35% of the cases. Adding additional 4 hid den units did not improve performance. Thus, these networks showed a very poor categorization performance. The main reason for this is the ambi- guity in the sensory data. This can be seen in Fig. 7 which depicts the sensory patterns that the net works categorized correctly, as a function of the distance and the angle of the robot relative to the objects. Sensory patterns could only be correctly catego rized in a rather narrow range of angles and dis tances. More specifically, objects could only be cat egorized when they were not more than 1 2 0° on the left or right-hand side, and no more than 32 mm away from the robot. In all other cases, the sensory data were ambiguous and the network could not categorize them appropriately. The white regions on the sides are obvious because there are no sensors on the back side of the robot. Also, the distant white areas are natural because the range of the sensors is limited. However, there are some white areas corresponding to locations very close to the robot. In other words, from most perspectives, the agent could in fact not learn the distinction. In summary, backpropagation net works similar to the A LC O V E model performed very poorly for the two categories. This is a truly surprising result: Why would such a trivial distinc tion not be learnable by the agent? The problem is to be seen in the general context of the object constancy problem. As discussed earlier, the prob lem is hard because one and the same object can lead to a very large num ber of different input pat terns depending on the viewing angle relative to the object, the lighting conditions, noise in the sen sors etc. Let us inspect this issue more closely.
In essence, we suggest, the core of the problem lies in the large input space and the ambiguities due to the object constancy problem. In a recent paper, Clark and Thornton (1997) have introduced the concept of type-2 problems to denote high dimensional spaces in which regularities appear only "hidden" or are only "m arginal". They distin guish type-2 (intractable) problems from type-1 problems where the regularities are apparent in the input data. Type-1 problems can be learned by an appropriate learning mechanism, i.e., one that is able to pick up regularities in the input space (e.g., backpropagation or even simple Hebbian learning). This is, however, not the case for type-2 problems where these regularities are not obvious and can only be recovered by means of appropri ate transform ations -"recodings" as Clark and Thornton call it -of the input data. In this case, type-2 problem s become type-1 problems and can be learned (for an illustration of type-1 and type-2 problems, see focus box 5). We can now reform ulate the core problem of categorization as follows: the main problem in category learning of real-world objects is to turn type-2 problems into type-1 problems. The above m entioned study by Nolfi (1996) suggests that even a universal learn ing device such as a backpropagation network can not learn the distinction between walls and small objects from static stimuli. In other words, these objects cannot be distinguished on the basis of the raw input stimuli alone. This indicates that addi tional mechanisms are needed that impose certain constraints on the sensory stimulation. Put dif ferently, the main problem lies in the fact that real world data such as the ones collected in Nolfi's study constitute type-2 learning problems and hence first have to be transformed (or they may not be learnable in the first place, i.e. they may not even be of type 2). In the black region of Fig. 7 the data are of type 1 , i.e. the invariances show up in the data which is why they can be learned with the backpropagation algorithm, whereas in the white regions, they are not. In the latter case, the data have first to be transformed into data of type 1 .
Box 5: Type 1 and type 2 problems
Roughly speaking, a problem is of type 1 if the regularities can be found in the data set itself. Reg ularity means that the input data can be mapped onto categories (the output). In other words, in type 1 data the output can be predicted with high probability from the input by statistical analysis of the data. If the data are of type 2 they have to be subjected to a transform ation before the outputs can be predicted from the inputs with high prob ability. This idea is illustrated in Tables I and II taken from Clark and Thornton (1997) . For exam ple, the conditional probability that the output is one, given that x l is 1 is 0.5, or the conditional probability that the output is 1 given that the input x2 is 2 is 0.67. Most of the conditional probabilities are close to chance. However if the data is trans formed, i.e. if we calculate x4 as the difference be tween the values of x l and x2 the conditional probabilities are 1. For example, the conditional probability p ( y l = 01x4 = 0) = 1. If we interpret x l , and x2 as sensory stimuli and y l as a category representation, we can say that in the first case, the mapping is not visible in the data (Table I) , whereas the in the transform ed case it is easily dis cernible ( Table II) . Note that the fact that a data set is not of type 1 does not automatically imply that it is of type 2 -there may be no regularities in the data set whatsoever, not even "hidden". There are two main strategies how this can be achieved. First, the internal processing of the input can be improved. Clark and Thornton (1997) , for example, suggest that already learned representa tions can be used to reduce the complexity of learning subsequent patterns. In other words, the early knowledge is a kind of "lens" through which input data are recoded (Clark and Thornton, 1997, p. 63 ). The idea is that instead of learning the whole input space at once, the problem can be broken down and made more tractable by "start ing small", i.e., learning some basic properties of the input, and then use the already learned knowl edge to "filter" the subsequent input. In this ac count we have to be aware of the fact that the features acquired early on will bias the system and the processing of subsequent input (see Clark and Thornton, 1997, p . 65f for a discussion of this prob lem). A nother possibility to increase the power of internal processing is to incorporate simple con straints such as symmetry in the network structure (e.g., Abu-M ostafa, 1992). This effectively means that the num ber of free param eters is reduced which leads to better generalization6 (Abu-Mo-6 Stated differently the learning machine's VC dimen sion is reduced. Thus, less training data are required to achieve the same level of generalization error. The term VC dimension stems from the fact that Vapnik and Chervonenkis are responsible or the pertinent theory development (which they originally published in Russian in 1974).
stafa, 1992; Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1989; Wapnik and Tscherwonenkis, 1979) . The constraints reflect a priori assumptions about the data dis tributions in the environment (e.g. that they are symmetric). A nother example is a continuity con straint, which in this case represents an assump tion about the type of objects in the environment. By exploiting such constraints, learning complex ity can often be significantly reduced. For a sys tematic account of these issues, see, for example Meier (1997) .
The second approach to transform type-2 into type-1 problems is directly derived from the basic tenets of embodied cognitive science. It consists in exploiting processes of system-environment in teraction. In other words, the idea is to exploit the fact that a mobile agent can actively structure its input by manipulating the world. We call this way of interacting with the world sensory-m otor coor dination (e.g. Pfeifer and Scheier, 1997; Pfeifer and Scheier, in press)7. We suggest that this m anipula tion can serve to transform a problem that would be of type 2 (without sensory-motor coordination) into one of type-1. We will return to this issue in the discussion section. In order to give a com pre hensive account we have to look at the additional case studies first.
Category learning based on sensory-m otor coordination
We start our elaboration of the alternative ap proach to category learning and representation suggested by em bodied cognitive science -sen sory-motor coordination -with two examples from evolutionary robotics. The idea in evolution ary approaches to em bodied cognitive science is to evolve the control architecture of an agent and reward individuals that achieve a high percentage of correct categorization by including them in the next generation of the evolutionary process. In this way, the following issue can be addressed: what strategy will prove to be the fittest, i.e., which ap proach will achieve the best categorization perfor mance? Based on the arguments introduced above we predict that whatever strategy will be the fit 7 We owe this term to John Dewey (Dewey, 1896) who pointed out the problems with the position of working from sensory stimulation, to internal processing, to output, over a century ago.
test, it will have to include mechanisms of sensorym otor coordination. An alternative strategy that robots might evolve -derived from the inform a tion processing framework -would be the m ap ping of sensory patterns to an internal representa tion of the categories (as, for example, in the ALCOVE model).
Distinguishing between cylinders and walls
Let us first look at the Nolfi study. We have al ready referred to one part of this study above. The point there was that a backpropagation network could not learn to distinguish between target ob jects (small cylinders) and walls. Here we sum m a rize the alternative approach that Nolfi has im ple m ented to address the problem of learning to distinguish between the two categories. He used a genetic algorithm to evolve a neural controller able to perform the categorization task. Individ uals were evolved in simulation, using the same sensory data as in the experiments with the back propagation networks, i.e., real sensory data were used to drive a simulated robot. The evolved in dividuals were then downloaded onto the physical robot (a K heperaIM robot) in order to test their capability to operate in the real world. The process began with 1 0 0 randomly generated genotypes, each representing a network with a different set of randomly assigned connection weights from in put to output layer. Each generation was allowed to operate for 5 epochs consisting of 500 actions each. At the beginning of each such epoch, the robot was randomly placed in the environment at some distance from the target object. A fter the fifth epoch, individuals were allowed to "repro duce" as follows. The networks of the 20 fittest individuals were copied five times, resulting in 1 0 0 (20x5) new individuals that constituted the next generation. Random mutations were introduced in this reproduction process. Overall. 100 generations were evolved. Fitness was computed by measuring the num ber of cycles an individual spent at a dis tance less than 8 cm from the target object. Three network architectures were used: networks with out hidden units, and with 4 or 8 hidden units, respectively. The first result was that on average networks without hidden units could solve this task better than the ones with hidden units (Nolfi (1996) , Fig. 4) . In other words, the network with the least means of internal representation outper formed the other networks. As pointed out by Nolfi, this might relate to the fact that additional hidden neurons require longer genotypes and thus increase the search space of the genetic algorithm (which then would be an artifact of the genetic algorithm, not directly related to the problem of categorization). A nother interpretation can be given, however, using the concept of sensory-mo tor coordination. Let us first summarize the beha vior of the evolved robots. All individuals never stop once they are in front of the target. Rather, they start to move back and forth as well as slightly to the left and right, thereby keeping a fixed range of angles and distances with respect to the target. In other words, the evolutionary pro cess has produced a mechanism of sensory-motor coordination in order to solve the categorization task.
This is a dem onstration of how sensory-motor coordination cannot only be used to enable a ro bot to categorize objects in its environment, but how such a behavior actually evolves in robots faced with a categorization task. Using the term i nology introduced above, we can describe the be havior of these agents as one that has turned the form er type-2 problem into a type-1 problem. This can also be seen in Fig. 8 where the relative posi tions a typical agent has assumed with respect to a target (the black area in Fig. 8 ) are shown. We m entioned that the category learning problem can be simplified by such a reduction and this is nicely dem onstrated by these experiments. In addition,
Fig. 8. The gray "wings" are the sensory patterns that the backpropagation networks categorized correctly (same data as shown in figure 7 top panel), as a function of the angle (x-axis) and the distance (y-axis) of the robot relative to the objects. The black area indicates the rela tive positions (angle and distance) that a typical evolved agent assumes when it reaches a target. Note that this area is very small, and also contains regions where the backpropagation networks did not categorize correctly (from Nolfi, 1996; Fig. 6 ).
however, the reduction must be such that regulari ties in this sensor space result. Although Nolfi did not analyze this aspect, we suspect that one would find clear signs of such regularities in the sensory data of the evolved agents. It is clear that there must be regularities because they can be seen in the agent's behavior. We will present such an analysis below in a different case study.
Distinguishing between cylinders and diamonds
In another study by Beer (1996) , very similar results were achieved. Beer also evolved agents that had to solve a categorization task. More speci fically, the agents had to discriminate between cir cles and diamonds, catching circles while avoiding the diamonds. The study was conducted in simula tion. The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 9 .
The agents could move horizontally. Objectsdiamonds and circles -were falling from above, starting from varying degrees of horizontal offsets. The neural network that controlled these agents Fig. 9 . The agent is equipped with a number of rays (bro ken lines) with which it can measure the distance from objects. Objects enter the environment from above and then move towards the agent. The agent has two motors with which it can move horizontally left and right. The task of the agent is to discriminate between circles and diamonds (a diamond is shown in the figure; adapted from Beer (1996) , p. 425).
was evolved using a genetic algorithm (see Beer (1996) , for details on this algorithm). The network consisted of 5 fully interconnected neurons that received input from 7 distance sensors on the agent, and that were connected to two m otor neu rons. Before evolving agents for this categorization task, Beer conducted another experim ent where agents only had to orient to an object. It turned out that even in this simple, simulated environ ment, agents that could visually discriminate be tween objects were much more difficult to evolve than agents that could simply orient to an object (p. 425). This again indicates that learning about categories is indeed a very hard problem even when one tries to simplify the problem by using simulated environments. So, how did the agents solve the categorization task in these experiments? The results are depicted in Fig. 10 .
The main points are as follows. The robot, when confronted with a circle or a diamond, first foveated the object (first 2 0 time units), then actively scanned the object in the next 2 0 time units, and finally either centered the object in the case of circles or avoided them in the case of diamonds. What is the reason for this "foveate-scan-decide" strategy (Beer, 1996) ? B eer suggests that the foveating behavior has the advantage of placing the object in a standard position with respect to the agent. This is another example of how sensory-mo tor coordination (foveating, active scanning) can help to simplify categorization and reduce the amount of information that has to be stored in ternally. In this case, the agent reduces the sensor space by assuming a standard position with respect to the object it has to categorize. In other words, "this agent is not merely centering and then stati cally pattern-m atching an object. Rather, its strat egy seems to be a dynamic one, with active scan ning apparently playing an essential role." (p. 426). Again, we suggest that sensory-m otor coordina tion transforms the sensor space such that regular ities become apparent and the objects can be learned. Based on this mechanism, all objects could be categorized correctly (Beer, 1996) . Note also that as in the case of the Nolfi (1996) study summarized above, this solution has not been hand-crafted but rather em erged out of an evolu tionary process.
In summary, the Nolfi and B eer experiments re veal that agents that were evolved to solve a cate gory learning problem employed mechanisms of sensory-motor coordination to solve the task, and did not try to learn a mapping from static input patterns to internal representations. The underly ing reason is that category learning in the real world is a type-2 problem and, as a consequence, regularities cannot be found without additional "tricks" that transform it to a type-1 problem. The best such "trick", we suggest, and the one that the evolutionary methods used in the experiments converged to, is sensory-motor coordination, i.e., the "trick" to interact with the objects so as to generate regularities in the input space. We sus pect that very similar processes were at work in natural evolution, leading to the types of sensorym otor coordination we can observe in natural agents.
We now turn to an information theoretic analy sis of the types of data generated by sensory-motor coordination.
Distinguishing betw een small and large objects Experim ent
In the following experim ent, a task similar to the one used in the Nolfi experiments was used: the agent has to learn to collect some types of ob jects (e.g., small ones) while ignoring others (e.g., large ones) i.e., it must be able to categorize the objects in its environm ent. Instead of using evolu tionary methods, the agent was designed based on the above considerations. The main goal was to design the agent that would be able to learn the categories based on mechanisms of sensory-motor coordination. We call this type of agent SMC (for sensory-raotor coordination) agent. The ecological niche is a flat environm ent with a home base to which the robot had to bring the objects it col lected (Fig. 11 ) (for details, see Scheier and Pfeifer (1995) ; Pfeifer and Scheier (1997) , in press).
Two types of objects were used: small and large cylinders with a height of 3 cm and 2 cm, and a diam eter of 1.5 cm and 4 cm, respectively. The task of the agent is to learn to bring the small ones to a home base while avoiding the large ones. W hen ever the agents picked up a small object, the sen sory-motor sequence preceding this event was re inforced. Large objects were too heavy for the robot to be picked up in which case there was no reinforcement signal. In all experiments, there were 15 objects of each category randomly distrib uted over the whole arena.
The arm of the gripper can move through any angle from vertical to horizontal, whereas the grip- (Fig. 12) .
The sensory system of the SMC agent was iden tical to the one used by Nolfi (except that all eight sensors are used in SMC). From his analysis we know that through this sensory system, the objects cannot be learned by trying to identify a mapping from sensory stimulation onto internal representa tion. The SMC agent is equipped with eight IR sensors. Each IR sensor has 210 (or roughly 1000) states which amounts to an input space consisting of roughly to 102 4 different states. The categoriza tion task is further complicated by the fact that there is a significant am ount of noise in the sensor data, and that the sensor readings for the two types of objects overlap. This is illustrated in Fig.  13 where the activation of the two front sensors of the robot are shown as the robot approached a small and a large object. The main idea of our approach is to reduce this high-dimensional space by appropriate interac tions with the object. W hat does it mean to reduce a high-dimensional space? In essence, it means to impose some structure or constraints on the num ber of states the various sensors can occupy. One way to do this is to generate spatio-tem poral correlations in the sensor space by interacting ap propriately with the object. In other words, the strategy is to explore the object in such a way that (a) there exist correlations between different sen sors and (b) the sensor readings are correlated in time. This is the approach we have chosen for the SMC agents. The sensory-m otor coordination that leads to a reduction in sensor space is circling. Fig. 13 . IR sensor readings for small and large objects. The data were taken from the front two sensors of the robot. The robot approached a small and a large object. The data are not only noisy, but there is significant over lap between the data from the two types of objects. Asterisks and plusses denote activation of IR sensor at front left of the robot for small and large objects, respec tively, and squares and diamonds denote activation of IR sensor at front right o f the robot for small and large objects, respectively.
Instead of having the robot approach the object from different angles and try to learn a mapping of the resulting sensor activation and some category node, we have the robot circle around the objects. This circling behavior induces high spatio-temporal correlations in the sensor patterns (see below). It is equivalent to the object rotation behavior found in human infants (Ruff, 1984) .
Before presenting results on the reduced sensor space we need to introduce the mechanisms un derlying the circling behavior. This is achieved by three processes, move-forward, avoid-obstacle, and turn-towards-object. In the architecture used, the processes are all continuously and asynchronously active and influence the m otor variables. The effect is as follows: Normally, the agent will move forward (move-forward process) and when encountering an obstacle, it will avoid it by turning away (avoid-obstacle process). At the same time, if there is stimula tion in one of its lateral (left or right) sensors, it will turn slightly towards the object (turn-towards-object process). The interaction of these three pro cesses leads to a behavior that we might want to call move-along-object. This is shown in Fig. 14 . This is a form of sensory-motor coordination: sensors and motor actions are coupled -they in fluence each other mutually. Let us look at the resulting sensor readings and m otor speeds. Figure  15 shows the activation of the IR sensors as the robot circles around the objects.
Note that there is relatively little variation in these data, in particular for the large objects (indi cated by asterisks in Fig. 15 ). For category learning, the m otor speeds were used in addition to these sensor activations. The im portant point about these m otor speeds is that they are different for the two types of objects. We can compute the angular veloc ity of the robot by subtracting the m otor speed of the left from the m otor speed from the right motor. This angular velocity is larger for small objects than for large ones. This is shown in Fig. 16 .
In this example, the robot first moved in the open plane for about 40 steps. It then started to circle around a small object for about 80 steps. A f ter it had left the object, the robot first moved in the open plane again, then avoided a large object (indicated by large fluctuations around 150 and 170 steps), and finally started again to circle around a small object at around 180 steps. The dif ference between the angular velocities can be ex ploited for category learning. In addition, how ever, we want the learning to be based on the sensory readings. We said at the beginning of this section that this learning is hard because of the high-dimensional state space. It turns out that the circling behavior just described, an example of sensory-motor coordination, significantly reduces the dimensionality of this space. 
Analysis
We now analyze the sensor space resulting from the circling behavior. The most im portant point to be noted is that the IR sensors vary very little due to the sensory-motor coordination behavior. In other words, the previously large state space has been significantly reduced. Let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of the sensor space of this robot.
(a)
Correlations: For the following analyses we had the robot move across the open plane, ap proach an object and circle around it. We recorded the sensory space of the robot by means of 1 0 -dimensional vectors consisting of the current read ings from the 8 IR sensors and the two motor speeds. The process of sensory-motor coordina tion -circling in this case -should lead to high correlations in these data. Two kinds of correla tions were calculated. The first one is the correla tion between the sensor readings over time: the 1 0 -dimensional vectors of the sensor readings are taken over a time window of 1 0 steps and the cor relations calculated. If the pattern is stable over time, the correlation will be high, if there is a lot of change, it will be low. This is shown in Fig. 17 . The second correlation is the one between the dif ferent sensor activations: this correlation will be high if the covariation between the sensors is high. In other words, the correlation can be high even if there is a lot of change in the sensor readings. Of course, if the pattern is stable over time -which is the case when the agent is circling around a cyl inder -the sensor readings will also be correlated.
If we inspect Fig. 17 we find that the correlation is at an interm ediate level as the agent moves about in the open (due to noise -if there were no noise, the correlation would be maximal). As the agent approaches an object, the correlation drops because now there is rapid change in sen sory activation. Once the agent is near the object, the dynamics of the reflexes begins to play and we have time-locked activity in the sensory space. This can be seen in the correlations which rapidly jump to the maximum level. Note that these corre lations are induced by the agent's own movements, or. in other words, by the sensory-m otor coordina tion. And the sensory-motor coordination requires embodiment. Stated differently, through its own behavior, the agent generates redundancy in the sensory signals. And, as is well-known, redundancy is the prerequisite for learning (Ashby, 1956) . We have shown previously, that the sensory-motor coupling leads to a reduction of the degrees of freedom in the input space. More specifically, the different objects can be learned based on one sin gle dimension (that can be m apped onto angular velocity) (Pfeifer and Scheier. 1997) .
The fact that there are correlations, i.e. that there is a stable pattern over time, also yields a focus of attention mechanism: whenever there are correlations, it is a good idea not only to heed the current situation, but also to learn. Because the stream is no longer just changing in arbitrary ways. there are very clear correlations that turn the cate gory learning problem into a tractable (type 1 ) one.
As an aside, note that the correlations shown in Fig. 17 , although they depend on the robot's individual characteristics, are "objective" and can be numerically calculated. Therefore they can, in principle, be picked up and exploited by the agent itself, thus providing the basis for what one might call "self-cognition". The agent can acquire a no tion of its own em ergent behavior.
(b)
Bartlett' s dimension: In order to further ex plore the issue of dimensionality of the sensory space we also calculated B artlett's measure of di mensionality of a data matrix (Jackson, 1991) . This measure yields the num ber of dimensions neces sary to explain the non-random variation in the data matrix. The hypothesis is that the num ber of dimensions is equal to the num ber of the largest unequal Eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the data matrix. A 6x30 matrix ( 6 In the case of circling, the num ber of dimensions is 1 which is equivalent to one principal compo nent. During approach the sensor readings change rapidly but they are still correlated which leads to a Bartlett dimension as low as 2. In the static case, the data were generated by randomly selecting a distance and a viewing angle, and then sampling the resulting sensory reading. In other words, the same procedure as applied by Nolfi in his back propagation experiments (see above) was used. The resulting dimensionality is 4 which might ex plain the problem s of the backpropagation algo rithm to learn to classify these data.
In summary, the core mechanism of SMC is to reduce the sensor space by means of sensory-motor coordination, in this particular case circling. The results obtained generalize to agents that, un like SMC, are equipped with several types of sen sors or modalities. Sensory-motor coordination leads to redundancies across modalities, which in turn significantly simplifies cross-modal learning. This is a fundamental process. It is, for example, the basis of cognitive developm ent in humans in fants (Thelen and Smith, 1994) . The main idea is illustrated in Fig. 18 .
Collision sensors and proximity sensors are based on different physical processes: in the for mer case it is actual touch (which can be imple m ented, for example, as a micro-switch), in the lat ter m easurem ent of reflected intensity of infrared light. W henever there is a collision, there is high activation in the proximity sensors that are adja cent to the particular collision sensor. Thus, if there is a collision, the information from the IR sensors is largely redundant. In other words, the agent is getting similar inform ation twice, once through every channel. This is an instance of socalled direct coupling. It only works if the sensors are positioned appropriately. This can immediately be seen by inspecting the robot in Fig. 18b . If this robot hits an obstacle, there is no overlap in the spatial information delivered by the two sensory channels and there is nothing to be learned. But the robot can behave in the real world. For exam ple, it could simply continuously move back and forth, such that both types of sensors are in front of the object alternatively. N ear an obstacle the sensory signals from the different channels will be correlated, just as for the properly designed robot in Fig. 18a . (An alternative would be to simply rotate the sensors, but that would be a somewhat different argument and we do not discuss it here). It is the more expensive solution than if the sen sors are mixed, as in Fig. 18a . If the wiggling angle is preprogram m ed, this is not a sensory-m otor co ordination, because the wiggling behavior of the robot is not influenced by the sensor signals. But if the wiggling behavior depends on the sensory Fig. 18 . Morphology, environment, and redundancy. The T-shaped sensors are collision detectors, the square ones proximity sensors (realized, e.g., by IR sensors), (a) R e dundancy generated through direct coupling when hit ting large object, (b) N o redundancy generated through direct coupling, but may be generated through sensorymotor coordination, (c) N o redundancy generated through direct coupling when hitting long thin object. signals we have the general phenom enon of a sensory-motor coordination. It would be interesting to use artificial evolution to see whether such wig gling behavior is in fact generated when we use as a fitness function distance traveled, minus a reduc tion for the collisions.
If the different types of sensors are positioned appropriately in advance by the designers, correla tions can be generated and learned through direct coupling -no sensory-m otor coordination is re quired, a cheap solution. But even if the sensory channels are not a priori positioned to yield corre lations, through its own behavior, through sensorym otor coordination, correlations can be achieved which can then be picked up by a learning mecha nism. This way, one sensory channel becomes a predictor for the other. To put it differently, the information from one sensory channel is partly contained in the other. We see that sensory-motor coordination provides flexibility in how the poten tial redundancy in the sensory signals of different channels can be exploited. So, the design decision of where to put the sensors becomes highly in volved: the potential overlaps in various types of sensory-motor coordinations have to be taken into account. W hat kinds of sensory-m otor coordina tions are possible or necessary depends, in turn on the environment. Imagine for a moment, that the robot in Fig. 18a operates in an environm ent with only narrow, vertical objects. The correlations could no longer be achieved through direct cou pling because the objects are not large enough to stimulate both sensors simultaneously (Fig. 18c) . The robot in Fig. 18c would have to engage in some kind of behavior (e.g. Wiggling back and forth) in order to generate the appropriate redun dancy required for learning.
As of now, there is no general solution to this problem of how to optimally design sensory sys tems with different channels and where to position the sensors. This is because this strongly depends on the task environment. Thus, a good bet, is once again to draw inspiration from natural systems, hoping that evolution did in fact a good designer's job. The phenom enon of redundancy in the dif ferent sensory channels is a universal one. We have seen examples from robots, and developm en tal studies provide abundant evidence for it. A fun illustration is the so-called M cGurk effect. It con cerns the fact that the visual and auditory channels are both used in speech perception. M cGurk and McDonald (1976) used videos of people uttering certain sounds and then they changed the sound, so that the physical sound was not compatible with the sound suggested by the video tape. For exam ple when the video showed /p a -p a / the physical sound was /n a -n a /. Their perceivers often re ported hearing /m a-m a/. A nother example is a / da/ on the video and a /ba/ as a physical sound. This was often reported as /va/ by perceivers. B e cause there is redundancy in the two channels, the perceivers noticed the incompatibility (not con sciously). The result was a kind of compromise: they seemed to believe both channels to some ex tent.
Discussion and Summary
What we have tried to do in this paper is to elucidate the prerequisites that have to be met by an agent if it is to acquire representations of ob jects in the world. We introduced two fundam ental concepts from embodied cognitive science, the complete agent perspective and the frame-of-reference problem. We have argued that often no clear distinction is made between behavior, in ternal mechanism and internal representation, and observer-based attributions. For example, we ar gued that the SMC agent had learnt distinctions between small and large cylinders. We can ask our selves generally when it is appropriate to state that an agent has learned to categorize the environ m ent in certain ways. In connectionist models like ALCOVE we say that this is the case if for certain feature vectors always a certain category node b e comes active (and not others). In other words, in these kinds of models, the definition of category learning is based on internal representations. W henever the correct node lights up, the correct categorization has been achieved. This kind of characterization relies on the internal representa tion of a category. In the SMC agent a different approach has been taken. We say that the SMC agent has learned to categorize its environm ent if it reacts differently to similar situations than it did earlier on, purely based on its behavior. For exam ple, at the beginning of the experim ent, the agent tried to pick up any object that it encountered, small or large. Over time, as it encountered a large object it would no longer pick it up. Thus, it makes sense to say that the agent has acquired category knowledge. We can then ask the question how this knowledge is represented internally. The purpose of the paper has been to dem onstrate that before we can discuss this question, we have to take em bodim ent into account, because real world sensory data are typically of type 2 which makes the for m ation of representation a demanding task.
In other words, we have been trying to work out some of the "prelim inaries", some basic under standing of what is involved in, so to speak, form ing an "internal world from an external one", which is one of the main purposes of representa tion. The main results are as follows.
(1)T he interaction with the environmentthrough sensory-m otor coordination -can provide the mechanisms of focus of attention (to deal with the continuously changing stream of sensory stimulation), and for di mensionality reduction. The various case studies have dem onstrated that sensory-motor coordination leads to situations that enable the agent to learn and employ category dis tinctions. The implication is that perception is not a sensory problem only (i.e. a phenom enon that concerns the input only), but rather something involving the entire agent, the sen sory and the m otor system. Traditional mod els typically do not have to deal with this problem in the first place, because they are not tested with real world data. The latter are, as we have seen, normally of type 2 , whereas the data used in traditional models often are of type 1. Of course, we have not provided a general solution to the hard prob lem of focus-of-attention. But we have shown how sensory-motor coordination can enable an agent to filter out the relevant stimulation from the continuous stream. (2) The problem of object constancy is hard be cause in general the data delivered by the sen sory systems are not of type 1. If behavioral regularities can be observed, it can be sus pected that the data are of type 2 , i.e. the regu larities have to be present in the data one way or other, but the data have to be subjected to a transform ation before the regularities become visible. We speculate that this transformation can -in some cases -be achieved by sensorym otor coordination (e.g, circling in the case of the SMC agent). The importance of the distinc tion between type 1 and type 2 data sets for learning problems can hardly be overesti mated. It is theoretically fundamental and shows clearly why "perception" (as defined by mapping sensory stimulation onto internal rep resentation) is hard. This is one of the most fundamental points to be made in this paper, i.e. the distinction between situations in which the regularities show up in the data (and can therefore be learned and represented), and sit uations where they don't, i.e. where an addi tional transform ation is required before the regularities can be seen. (3) The redundancy generated in the sensory sig nals through sensory-m otor coordination forms the basis for category learning. The in teresting aspect from a complete agent per spective is that the redundancy is not simply given but has to be generated. This provides an additional theoretical reason why it might be beneficial to engage in sensory-m otor coor dination. It furnishes the foundation for sensi ble learning processes to take place. It is an other instance where we clearly see the importance of embodiment. M ore details, as well as quantitative measures are provided in Pfeifer and Scheier (in press; chapter 13). (4) The sensory signals, and thus the internal rep resentations (in whatever form they are en coded) are strongly dependent on the nature of the sensors and on where the sensors are positioned on the agent, i.e. on the morphology of the agent. This is one of the essential impli cations of embodiment. Systems in nature have a distribution of sensors suitable for their p ar ticular ecological niche. Recall the case study of motion parallax where there is an array of identical EM Ds for m otion detection. The in terpretation of their activation requires an un derstanding of the morphology of the eye. An additional illustration is provided by the following simple thought experiment. Assume that the agent has learned to categorize small and large cylinders. Now change the position of the IR sensors by moving them, for example, all to one side of the robot and leaving the neural network exactly as it is: the agent will no longer be able to perform the categoriza tion task.
In summary, as m entioned a num ber of times, we have not yet solved the problem of representa tion, nor have we been able to provide a general formalism. Rather, we have outlined a num ber of fundamental considerations to take into account in the discussion of representation. Much additional research will be required to arrive at a general "theory of embodied representation".
